Lon L. Fuller (1902-1978) was an American legal philosopher known for his contributions to jurisprudence and the philosophy of law. His work is noted for its emphasis on the procedural aspects of law and its intersection with morality.
Law as a System of Rules
Fuller viewed law as a system of rules established by human beings that guides and regulates human conduct. He identified several characteristics that a legal system must possess to effectively fulfill this role, which he termed ‘the internal morality of law.’ This internal morality comprises eight principles that reflect the procedural aspects of law, including generality, publicity, non-retroactivity, clarity, non-contradiction, possibility of compliance, stability, and congruence between declared rule and official action.
Fuller argued that a system failing to adhere to these principles would not merely be a bad legal system but would fail to be a legal system at all. For instance, a system that enacted retroactive laws or failed to publicize its laws would lack the predictability and consistency necessary for individuals to guide their actions in accordance with the law.
Morality of Law
While Fuller was often classified as a legal positivist, he disagreed with the positivist view that law and morality are separate domains. Instead, he saw a necessary connection between law and morality, embodied in the concept of the internal morality of law.
According to Fuller, a legal system that violates its internal morality, such as by enacting contradictory or unclear laws, would also be morally deficient. This is because it would fail to respect individuals’ autonomy and their capacity to follow rules, which are fundamental moral values.
Fuller’s Critique of Legal Positivism
Fuller was a vocal critic of legal positivism, particularly as presented by H.L.A. Hart. He disputed Hart’s assertion that a legal system could be morally neutral and still function effectively.
In his famous debate with Hart, Fuller argued that a system lacking in internal morality would be so defective that it could not effectively guide human conduct, and thus could not be considered a legal system.
He also critiqued Hart’s ‘rule of recognition,’ a secondary rule that identifies what counts as law in a system. Fuller argued that this rule, by itself, is insufficient for a functional legal system without the support of the principles of internal morality.
Fuller’s work continues to be influential in legal philosophy, particularly in the fields of natural law theory and legal ethics. His emphasis on the procedural aspects of law and the moral considerations inherent in these procedures has enriched our understanding of law’s nature and purpose.